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Abstract—The popularity of mobile devices and location-based
services (LBS) has created great concern regarding the location
privacy of their users. Anonymization is a common technique
that is often used to protect the location privacy of LBS users.
Here, we present an information-theoretic approach to define the
notion of perfect location privacy. We show how LBS’s should
use the anonymization method to ensure that their users can
achieve perfect location privacy.
First, we assume that a user’s current location is independent
from her past locations. Using this i.i.d model, we show that if
the pseudonym of the user is changed before O(n 2r−1 ) observations
are made by the adversary for that user, then the user has perfect
location privacy. Here, n is the number of the users in the network
and r is the number of all possible locations that users can go
to.
Next, we model users’ movements using Markov chains to
better model real-world movement patterns. We show that perfect
location privacy is achievable for a user if the user’s pseudonym
is changed before O(n
2
|E|−r ) observations are collected by the
adversary for the user, where |E| is the number of edges in the
user’s Markov chain model.
Index Terms—Location Privacy, Mobile Networks, Information
Theoretic Privacy, Anonymization, Location Privacy Protecting
Mechanism (LPPM), Markov Chains.
I. Introduction
MOBILE devices offer a wide range of services byrecording and processing the geographic locations of
their users. Such services, broadly known as location-based
services (LBS), include navigation, ride-sharing, dining rec-
ommendation, and auto-collision warning applications. While
such LBS applications offer a wide range of popular and
important services to their users, they impose significant
privacy threats because of their access to the location infor-
mation of these wireless devices. Privacy compromises can
also be launched by other types of adversaries including third-
party applications, nearby mobile users, and cellular service
providers.
To protect the location privacy of LBS users, various
mechanisms have been designed [3]–[5], which are known
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as Location-Privacy Protection Mechanisms (LPPM). These
mechanisms tend to perturb the information of wireless de-
vices, such as the user’s identifier or location coordinates,
before they get disclosed to the LBS application. LPPMs
can be classified into two classes; those that perturb the
user’s identity information are known as identity perturbation
mechanisms while those that perturb the location information
of the users are known as location perturbation mechanisms.
Improving the location privacy of users using these LPPMs
usually comes at the price of performance degradation for the
underlying LBS’s, so finding the optimal LPPM with respect
to the LBS is still a great concern.
In the proposed framework, we employ the anonymization
technique to hide the identity of users over time. First, we
assume that each user’s current location is independent from
her past locations in order to simplify the derivations. Then,
we model the users’ movements by Markov chains which is a
more realistic setting by considering the dependencies between
locations over time. When dealing with privacy, it is advisable
to assume the strongest model for the adversary, so in this
paper we assume that the adversary has complete statistical
knowledge of the users’ movements. We formulate a user’s
location privacy based on the mutual information between
the adversary’s anonymized observations and the user’s actual
location information. We define the notion of perfect location
privacy and show that with a properly designed anonymization
method, users can achieve perfect location privacy.
Parts of this work has been previously presented as two
conference publications [1], [2]. In this manuscript, we extend
our previous work in [1], [2] by offering new results, analysis,
and perspective. In particular, we provide a clean-slate proof
for Theorem 1 to make sure all parts of the proof are presented
in a rigorous way. More specifically, the old proof in [1] was
only presented in a summary format; a few lemmas were
stated without proof or with just a sketch of a proof. On the
other hand, here we provide the new proof along with all
the required details. Also, we have revised and extended our
discussions. For example, Section IV is added to the paper to
clearly elaborate on the problem setting in the paper.
It is worth noting that this paper focuses on the theoretical
foundations of the location privacy problem when anonymiza-
tion is used as an LPPM mechanism. Needless to say, when
implementing anonymization-based LPPMs in practice our
analysis needs to get adjusted to each scenario’s specific threat
model, e.g., the number of mobile entities, the capabilities of
the adversary (the number and location of observation points,
prior knowledge about mobile entities, etc.), the extent of
possible geographic locations, etc.
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2II. Related Work
Location privacy has been an active field of research over
the past decade [3], [6]–[14]. Studies in this field can be
classified into two main classes: 1) Designing effective LPPMs
for specific LBS systems and platforms, 2) Deriving theoretical
models for location privacy, e.g., deriving metrics to quantify
the location privacy.
The designed LPPMs can be classified into two classes: 1)
Location perturbation LPPMs, 2) Identity perturbation LPPMs.
Location perturbation LPPMs aim at obfuscating the location
information of the users over time and geographical domain
with methods such as cloaking, [6], [10], and adding dummy
locations, [11], [12]. On the other hand, identity perturbation
LPPMs try to obfuscate the user’s identity while using an LBS.
Some common approaches to perturb the identity of the user
is to either exchange users’ identifiers, [15], or assign random
pseudonyms to them, known as anonymization technique, [16],
[17]. The former method usually uses some pre-defined re-
gions, called mixed-zones, to exchange users’ identifiers within
those regions. As users cross such regions, they exchange
their identifiers with other users in the same region using an
encryption protocol to confuse the adversary, [18], [19].
Previous studies have shown that using anonymization alone
is not enough to protect users’ location privacy in real-world
scenarios where users go to unique locations. Particularly,
Zang et al. demonstrate that an adversary has a significant
advantage in identifying users who visit unique locations
[20]. Also, Golle and Partridge show that the possibility of
user identification based on anonymized location traces is
significantly increased when the individual’s home and work
locations are known [21]. Please note that this does not contra-
dict the analysis and findings of our paper as we use a different
setting. First, our analysis seeks to find the theoretical limits
of privacy for situations where the number of users (N) goes
to infinity, which is not the case in previous studies like [20],
[21]. Increasing the number of user reduces an adversary’s
confidence in distinguishing different users. Second, in our
analysis we assume “continuous” density functions for the
movements of the users across different locations (e.g., the
fP(p) function in Section ??). Therefore, user distributions do
not contain Dirac delta functions representing their unique
locations. Note that this is not an unrealistic assumption;
in real-world scenarios with users having unique locations,
we assume that the location information is pre-processed to
satisfy this continuity requirement. Such pre-processing can
be performed in two ways; first, by reducing the granularity
of locations, e.g., in our analysis we divide a region of interest
into a number of girds (i.e., into r coarse-grained locations).
Second, an obfuscation mechanism can be applied to location
traces to ensure they satisfy the continuity requirement. Further
discussion on implementing such pre-processing is out of the
scope of our work and we leave it to future work.
A related, but in parallel, approach to our study is dif-
ferential privacy-based mechanisms. Differential privacy is
mainly studied in the context of databases containing sensitive
information, where the goal of differential privacy is to respond
queries on the aggregation of the information in the database
without revealing sensitive information about the individual
entries in the database. Differential privacy has been exten-
sively studied in the context of location privacy, i.e., to prevent
data leakage from location information databases [8], [22]–
[26]. The goal here is to insure that the presence of no single
user could noticeably change the outcome of the aggregated
location information. For instance, Ho et al. [27] proposed a
differentially private location pattern mining algorithm using
quadtree spatial decomposition. Some location perturbation
LPPMs are based on ideas from differential privacy [23], [28]–
[31]. For instance, Dewri [32] suggest to design obfuscation
LPPMs by applying differential perturbations. Alternatively,
Andres et al. hide the exact location of each user in a region by
adding Laplacian distributed noise to achieve a desired level of
geo-indistinguishability [31]. Note that our approach is entirely
in parallel with this line of work. Our paper tries to achieve
the theoretical limits on location privacy—independent of
the LPPM mechanisms being used—while differential privacy
based studies on location privacy try to design specific LPPM
mechanisms under very specific application scenarios.
Several works aim at quantifying the location privacy of
mobile users. A common approach is called K-anonymity, [4],
[16]. In K-anonymity, each user’s identity is kept indistinguish-
able within a group of k − 1 other users. On the other hand,
Shokri et al. [13], [14] define the expected estimation error of
the adversary as a metric to evaluate LPPMs. Ma et al. [33] use
the uncertainty of the users’ location information to quantify
the location privacy of the user in vehicular networks. Li et
al. [34] define metrics to show the tradeoff between the privacy
and utility of LPPMs.
Wang et al. tried to protect the privacy of the users for
context sensing on smartphones, using Markov decision pro-
cess (MDP) [35]. The adversary’s approach and user’s privacy
preserving mechanism is changing during time. The goal is to
obtain the optimal policy of the users.
Previously, the mutual information has been used as a
privacy metric in different topics, [36]–[40]. However, in this
paper we use the mutual information specifically for location
privacy. For this reason, a new setting for this privacy problem
will be provided and discussed. Specifically, we provide an
information theoretic definition for location privacy using the
mutual information. We show that wireless devices can achieve
provable perfect location privacy by using the anonymization
method in the suggested way.
In [41], the author studies asymptotically optimal matching
of sequences to source distributions. However, there are two
key differences between [41] and this paper. First, [41] looks
only at the optimal matching tests, but does not consider
any privacy metric (i.e., perfect privacy) as considered in this
paper. The major part of our work is to show that the mutual
information converges to zero so we can conclude there is no
privacy leak (hence perfect privacy). Also, the setting of [41]
is different as it assumes a fixed distribution on sources (i.e.,
classical inference) as we assume the existence of a general
(but possibly unknown) prior distributions for the sources (i.e.
a Bayesian setting).
3III. Framework
A. Defining Location Privacy
In the proposed framework, we consider a region in which a
large number of wireless devices are using an LBS. To support
their location privacy, the anonymization technique is being
used by the LBS. An outsider adversary A is interested in
identifying users based on their locations and movements. We
consider this adversary to be the strongest adversary that has
complete statistical knowledge of the users’ movements based
on the previous observations or other resources. The adversary
has a model that describes users’ movements as a random
process on the corresponding geographic area.
Let Xu(t) be the location of user u at time t, and n be the
number of users in our network. The location data of users
can be represented in the form of the following stochastic
processes:
X1(1) X1(2) X1(3) · · · X1(m) X1(m + 1) · · ·
X2(1) X2(2) X2(3) · · · X2(m) X2(m + 1) · · ·
X3(1) X3(2) X3(3) · · · X3(m) X3(m + 1) · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Xn(1) Xn(2) Xn(3) · · · Xn(m) Xn(m + 1) · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
The adversary’s observations are anonymized versions of the
Xu(t)’s produced by the anonymization technique. She is
interested in knowing Xu(t) for u = 1, 2, ..., n based on her
m anonymized observations for each of the n users, where m
is a function of n, e.g., m = m(n). Thus, at time m, the data
shown in the box has been produced:
X1(1) X1(2) X1(3) · · · X1(m) X1(m + 1) · · ·
X2(1) X2(2) X2(3) · · · X2(m) X2(m + 1) · · ·
X3(1) X3(2) X3(3) · · · X3(m) X3(m + 1) · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Xn(1) Xn(2) Xn(3) · · · Xn(m) Xn(m + 1) · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
The goal of this paper is to find the function m = m(n) in a
way that perfect privacy is guaranteed. Let Y(m) be a collection
of anonymized observations available to the adversary. That
is, Y(m) is the anonymized version of the data in the box. We
define perfect location privacy as follows:
Definition 1. User u has perfect location privacy at time t, if
and only if
lim
n→∞ I
(
Xu(t); Y(m)
)
= 0,
where I(X; Y) shows the mutual information between x and y.
The above definition implies that over time, the adversary’s
anonymized observations do not give any information about
the user’s location. The assumption of large n, (n → ∞), is
valid for almost all applications that we consider since the
numbers of users for such applications are usually very large.
In order to achieve perfect location privacy, we only con-
sider anonymization techniques to confuse the adversary. In
particular, the anonymization can be modeled as follows:
3
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Fig. 1: An area is divided into five regions that users can
occupy.
We perform a random permutation Π(n), chosen uniformly
at random among all n! possible permutations on the set of n
users, and then assign the pseudonym Π(n)(u) to user u
Π(n) : {1, 2, · · · , n} 7→ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Throughout the paper, we may use Π(u) instead of Π(n)(u) for
simplicity of the notation.
For u = 1, 2, · · · , n, let X(m)u be a vector which shows the
uth user’s locations at times t = 1, 2, . . . ,m:
X(m)u = (Xu(1), Xu(2), · · · , Xu(m))T
Using the permutation function Π(n), the adversary observes a
permutation of users’ location vectors, X(m)u ’s. In other words,
the adversary observes
Y(m) = Perm
(
X(m)1 ,X
(m)
2 , · · · ,X(m)n ; Π(n)
)
(1)
=
(
X(m)
Π−1(1),X
(m)
Π−1(2), · · · ,X(m)Π−1(n)
)
=
(
Y(m)1 ,Y
(m)
2 , · · · ,Y(m)n
)
Y(m)u = X
(m)
Π−1(u), Y
(m)
Π(u) = X
(m)
u
where Perm(.) shows the applied permutation function. Then,
Y(m)
Π(u) = X
(m)
u = (Xu(1), Xu(2), · · · , Xu(m))T .
IV. Example
Here we provide a simple example to further elaborate the
problem setting. Assume that we have only three users, n = 3,
and five locations, r = 5, that users can occupy (Figure 1).
Also, let’s assume that the adversary can collect m(n) = 4
observations per user. Each user creates a path as below:
user path
user1 1→ 2→ 3→ 4
user2 2→ 1→ 3→ 5
user3 4→ 5→ 1→ 3
X(4)1 =

1
2
3
4
 , X(4)2 =

2
1
3
5
 , X(4)3 =

4
5
1
3
 , X(4) =

1 2 4
2 1 5
3 3 1
4 5 3

To anonymize the users, we will assign a pseudonym to
each. The pseudonyms are determined by the function defined
by a random permutation on the user set:
Π(3) : {1, 2, 3} 7→ {1, 2, 3}
4For this example, suppose that the permutation function is
given by Π(1) = 3, Π(2) = 1, and Π(3) = 2. The choice of
the permutation is the only piece of information that is not
available to the adversary. So here, the adversary observes
anonymized users and their paths:
pseudonym observation
user 1 2→ 1→ 3→ 5
user 2 4→ 5→ 1→ 3
user 3 1→ 2→ 3→ 4
Y(4) =

2 4 1
1 5 2
3 1 3
5 3 4

and she wants to find which user (with the pseudomym
user3) actually made 1 → 2 → 3 → 4, and so on for the
other users. Based on the number of observations that the
adversary collects for each user, m = m(n) = 4, and also
the statistical knowledge of the users’ movements, she aims at
breaking the anonymization function and de-anonymizing the
users. The accuracy of this method depends on the number
of observations that the adversary collects, and thus our main
goal in this paper is to find the function m(n) in a way that the
adversary is unsuccessful and the users have perfect location
privacy.
V. i.i.d Model
A. Perfect Location Privacy for a Simple Two-State Model
To get a better insight about the location privacy problem,
here we consider a simple scenario where there are only two
states to which users can go, states 0 and 1. At any time
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }, user u has probability pu ∈ (0, 1) to be at
state 1, independent from her previous locations and other
users’ locations. Therefore,
Xu(k) ∼ Bernoulli(pu).
To keep things general, we assume that pu’s are drawn
independently from some continuous density function, fP(p),
on the (0, 1) interval. Specifically, there are δ2 > δ1 > 0 such
that1 δ1 < fP(p) < δ2 p ∈ (0, 1)fP(p) = 0 p < (0, 1)
The values of pu’s are known to the adversary. Thus, the
adversary can use this knowledge to potentially identify the
users. Note that our results do not depend on the choice of
fP(p) and we do not assume that we know the underlying
distribution fP(p). All we assume here is the existence of such
distribution. The following theorem gives a general condition
to guarantee perfect location privacy:
Theorem 1. For two locations with the above definition and
anonymized observation vector of the adversary, Y(m), if all
the following holds
1) m = cn2−α, for some positive constants c and α < 1;
2) p1 ∈ (0, 1);
3) (p2, p3, · · · , pn) ∼ fP;
4) P = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) be known to the adversary;
1The condition δ1 < fP(p) < δ2 is not actually necessary for the results and
can be relaxed; however, we keep it here to avoid unnecessary technicalities.
then, we have
∀k ∈ N, lim
n→∞ I
(
X1(k); Y(m)
)
= 0
i.e., user 1 has perfect location privacy.
Note that although the theorem is stated for user 1, the
symmetry of the problem allows it to be restated for all users.
Also note that the theorem is proven for any 0 < α < 1.
Therefore, roughly speaking, the theorem states that if the
adversary obtains less than O(n2) observations per user, then
all users have location privacy.
B. The Intuition Behind The Proof
Here we provide the intuition behind the proof, and the
rigorous proof for Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. Let
us look from the adversary’s perspective. The adversary is
observing anonymized locations of the first user and she wants
to figure out the index of the user that she is observing, in
other words she wants to obtain X1(k) from Y(m). Note that the
adversary knows the values of p1, p2, · · · , pn. To obtain X1(k),
it suffices that the adversary obtains Π(1). This is because
X(m)1 = Y
(m)
Π(1), so
X1(k) = the kth element of X(m)1
= the kth element of Y(m)
Π(1).
Since Xu(k) is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter
pu, to do so, the adversary can look at the averages
YΠ(u) =
YΠ(u)(1) + YΠ(u)(2) + ... + YΠ(u)(m)
m
.
In fact, YΠ(u)’s provide sufficient statistics for this problem.
Now, intuitively, the adversary is successful in recovering Π(1)
if two conditions hold:
1) YΠ(1) ≈ p1.
2) For all u , 1, YΠ(u) is not too close to p1.
Now, note that by the Central Limit Theorem (CLT)
YΠ(u) − pu√
pu(1−pu)
m
→ N (0, 1) .
That is, loosely speaking, we can write
YΠ(u) → N
(
pu,
pu(1 − pu)
m
)
.
Consider an interval I ∈ (0, 1) such that p1 falls into that
interval and length of I, l(n), is chosen to be
l(n) =
1
n1−η
,
where 0 < η < α2 (Remember α was defined by the equation
m = cn2−α in the statement of Theorem 1) . Note that l(n)
goes to zero as n becomes large. Also, note that for any u ∈
1, 2, · · · , n, the probability that pu is in I is larger than δ1l(n).
In other words, since there are n users, we can guarantee that
a large number of pu’s fall in I since we have
nl(n) → ∞.
5On the other hand, note that√
Var(YΠ(u))
length(I)
=
√
pu(1−pu)
m
1
n1−η
= n
α
2 −η → ∞.
Note that here, we will have a large number of normal
random variables YΠ(u) whose expected values are in the
interval I (that has a vanishing length) with high probability
and their standard deviations are much larger than the interval
length (but equal to each other asymptotically, i.e. p1(1−p1)m ).
Thus, distinguishing between them will become impossible
for the adversary. In other words, the probability that the
adversary will correctly identify Π(1) goes to zero as n goes
to infinity. That is, the adversary will most likely choose an
incorrect value j for Π(1). In this case, since the locations of
different users are independent, the adversary will not obtain
any useful information by looking at X j(k). Of course, the
above argument is only intuitive. The rigorous proof has to
make sure all the limiting conditions work out appropriately.
This has been accomplished in Appendix A.
C. Extension to r-States Model
Here, we extend our results to a scenario in which we have
r ≥ 2 locations, 0, 1, · · · , r − 1. At any time k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · },
user u has probability pu(i) ∈ (0, 1) to be at location i,
independent from her previous locations and other users’
locations. At any given time k, pu(i) shows the probability
of user u being at location i and vector pu contains pu(i)’s for
all the locations
pu(i) = P(Xu(k) = i),
pu = (pu(0), pu(1), · · · , pu(r − 1)) .
We assume that pu(i)’s for i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , r − 2 are drawn
independently from some r−1 dimensional continuous density
function fP(p) on the (0, 1)r−1. In particular, define the range
of distribution as
RP = {(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ (0, 1)r−1 :
xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + xr−1 < 1}.
Then, we assume there exists positive constants δ1, δ2 > 0 such
that δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2 pu ∈ RPfP(pu) = 0 pu < RP
For example, Figure 2 shows the range RP for the case where
there are three locations, r = 3.
Theorem 2. For r locations with the above definition and the
adversary with an observation vector Y(m), if all the following
holds
1) m = cn
2
r−1−α, which c, α > 0 and are constant
2) p1 ∈ (0, 1)r
3)
(
p2,p3, · · · ,pn
) ∼ fP, 0 < δ1 < fP < δ2
4) P =
(
p1,p2, · · · ,pn
)
is known to the adversary
1
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Fig. 2: RP for case r = 3, (d = 2).
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Fig. 3: p1 = (p1(0), p1(1), · · · , p1(r − 1)) is in set J(n) in RP.
then, we have
∀k ∈ N, lim
n→∞ I
(
X1(k); Y(m)
)
= 0
i.e., user 1 has perfect location privacy.
Proof of the Theorem 2 is analogous to the proof of
Theorem 1. Here, we provide the general intuition. We do
not provide the entire rigorous proof as it is for the most
part repetition of the arguments provided for Theorem 1 in
Appendix A.
Let d be equal to r − 1. As you can see in Figure 3, for
three locations there exists a set J(n) such that p1 is in that set
and we have
Vol(J(n)) = (l(n))d.
We choose l(n) = 1
n
1
d −η
, where η < α2 . Thus, the average number
of users with p vector in J(n) is
n
1(
n
1
d−η
)d = ndη → ∞ as n→ ∞,
so we can guarantee that a large number of users are in the set
J(n). This can be done exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1
using Chebyshev’s Inequality.
Here, the number of times a user is at each location follows
a multinomial distribution and in the long run, these numbers
have a jointly gaussian distribution asymptotically as n goes
to infinity. The standard deviation of these variables are in the
form of const√m . Moreover, the standard deviation over length of
this interval is also large
const.√
m
l(n)
=
const. n
1
d−η√
m
∼ n
1
d−η
(n
2
d−α) 12
= n
α
2 −η → ∞ as n→ ∞.
Again, we have a large number of asymptotically jointly
normal random variables that have a much larger standard
6deviation compared to the differences of their means. Thus,
distinguishing between them becomes impossible.
This suggests that it is impossible for the adversary to
correctly identify a user based on her observations even though
he knows P and Y(m). So, all the users have perfect location
privacy. The proof can be made rigorous exactly the same way
we did for the proof of Theorem 2, so we do not repeat the
details here.
VI. Markov Chain Model
Assume there are r possible locations to which users can
go. We use a Markov chain with r states to model movements
of each user. We define E, the set of edges in this Markov
chain, such that (i, j) is in E if there exists an edge from i to
j with probability p(i, j) > 0.
We assume that this Markov structure chain gives the
movement pattern of each user and what differentiates between
users is their transition probabilities. That is, for fixed locations
i and j, two different users could have two different transition
probabilities. For simplicity, let’s assume that all users start
at location (state) 1, i.e., Xu(1) = 1 for all u = 1, 2, · · · . This
condition is not necessary and can be easily relaxed; however,
we assume it here for the clarity of exposition. We now state
and prove the theorem that gives the condition for perfect
location privacy for a user in the above setting.
Theorem 3. For an irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain with
r states and |E| edges, if m = cn 2|E|−r−α, where c > 0 and α > 0
are constants, then
lim
n→∞ I(X1(k); Y
(m)) = 0, ∀k ∈ N, (2)
i.e., user 1 has perfect location privacy.
Proof. Let Mu(i, j) be the number of observed transitions from
state i to state j for user u. We first show that MΠ(u)(i, j)’s pro-
vide a sufficient statistic for the adversary when the adversary’s
goal is to obtain the permutation Π(n). To make this statement
precise, let’s define M(m)u as the matrix containing Mu(i, j)’s
for user u:
M(m)u =

Mu(1, 1) Mu(1, 2) · · · Mu(1, r)
Mu(2, 1) Mu(2, 2) · · · Mu(2, r)
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
Mu(r, 1) Mu(r, 2) · · · Mu(r, r)

Also, let M(m) be the ordered collection of M(m)u ’s. Specifically,
M(m) =
(
M(m)1 ,M
(m)
2 , · · · ,M(m)n
)
The adversary can obtain Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
, a permuted version
of M(m). In particular, we can write
Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
= Perm
(
M(m)1 ,M
(m)
2 , · · · ,M(m)n ; Π(n)
)
=
(
M(m)
Π−1(1),M
(m)
Π−1(2), · · · ,M(m)Π−1(n)
)
.
We now state a lemma that confirms Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
is a
sufficient statistic for the adversary, when the adversary’s goal
is to recover Π(n). Remember that Y(m) is the collection of
anonymized observations of users’ locations available to the
adversary.
Lemma 1. Given Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
, the random matrix Y(m)
and the random permutation Π(n) are conditionally indepen-
dent. That is
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Y(m) = y,Perm(M(m),Π(n)) = m) = (3)
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Perm(M(m),Π(n)) = s)
Lemma 1 is proved in the Appendix B.
Next note that since the Markov chain is irreducible and
aperiodic, when we are determining p(i, j)’s, there are d
degrees of freedom, where d is equal to |E|−r. This is because
for each states i, we must have
r∑
j=1
p(i, j) = 1.
Thus, the Markov chain of the user u is completely determined
by d values of p(i, j)’s which we show as
Pu = (pu(1), pu(2), · · · , pu(d))
and Pu’s are known to the adversary for all users. Note that
the choice of Pu is not unique; nevertheless, as long as we fix
a specific Pu, we can proceed with the proof. We define Ed as
the set of d edges whose p(i, j)’s belong to Pu. Let Rp ⊂ Rd be
the range of acceptable values for Pu. For example, in Figure
4 we have |E| = 6 and r = 3, so we have three independent
transitions probabilities. If we choose p1, p2, and p3 according
to the figure, we obtain the following region
Rp = {(p1, p2, p3) ∈ R3 : 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2, 3 and
p1 + p2 ≤ 1}.
1p1
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Fig. 4: Three states Markov chain example
The statistical properties of each user are completely known
to the adversary since she knows the Markov chain of each
user. The adversary wants to be able to distinguish between
users by having m observations per user and also knowing
Pu’s for all users.
In this model, we assume that Pu for each user u is
drawn independently from a d-dimensional continuous density
function, fP(p). As before, we assume there exist positive
constants δ1, δ2 > 0, such thatδ1 < fP(p) < δ2 p ∈ RpfP(p) = 0 p < Rp
7We now claim that the adversary’s position in this problem
is mathematically equivalent to the the i.i.d model where the
number of locations r is equal to d + 1 where d = |E| − r.
First, note that since the Markov chain is irreducible and
aperiodic, it has a unique stationary distribution which is
equal to the limiting distribution. Next, define Qu to be the
vector consisting of all the transition probabilities of user u.
In particular, based on the above argument, we can represent
Qu in the following way:
Qu = [Pu,PuB],
where B is a non-random d by |E| − d matrix. Now, note that
PuB is a non-random function of Pu. In particular, if Mu(i, j)
shows the observed number transitions from state i to state j
for user u, then we only need to know Mu(i, j) for the edges
in Ed, as the rest will be determined by the linear transform
defined by B. This implies that the decision problem for the
adversary is reduced to the decision problem on transition
probabilities in Pu and the adversary only needs to look at the
Mu(i, j)’s for the edges in Ed. Now, this problem has exactly
the same structure as the i.i.d model where the number of
locations r is equal to d + 1 where d = |E| − r. In particular,
Mu(i, j)’s have multinomial distributions and the statement of
Theorem 3 follows by applying Theorem 2.

Discussion: One limitation of the above formulations is
that all users must have the same Markov chain graphs
with only different transition probabilities. In reality, there
might be users that have different Markov chain graphs. For
example, we might have users that never visit a specific region.
Nevertheless, we can address this issue in the following way.
If we are considering the location privacy of user 1, we only
consider users that have the same Markov chain graph (but
with different transitions probabilities). The other users are
easily distinguishable from user 1 anyway. Now, n would be
the total number of this new set of users and again we can
apply Theorem 3. If n is not large enough in this case, then
we need to use location obfuscation techniques in addition to
anonymization to achieve perfect privacy.
VII. Conclusion
We presented an information theoretic definition for perfect
location privacy using the mutual information between the
users’ actual locations and the anonymized observations that
the adversary collects. First, we modeled users’ movements to
be independent from their previous locations. In this model,
we have n users and r locations. We prove that if the number
of anonymized observations that the adversary collects, m, is
less than O(n
2
r−1 ) then users will have perfect location privacy.
So, if the anonymization method changes pseudonyms of users
before O(n
2
r−1 ) observations is made by the adversary for each
user, then the adversary cannot distinguish between users and
they can achieve perfect location privacy. Then, we modeled
users’ movements using Markov chains so that their current
locations affect their next moves. We proved that for such a
user, perfect location privacy is achievable if the pseudonym
of the user is changed before O(n
2
|E|−r ) number of observations
is made by the adversary.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1 (Perfect Location Privacy for Two-State
Model)
Here, we provide a formal proof for Theorem 1. In the
proposed setting, we assume we have an infinite number of
potential users indexed by integers, and at any step we consider
a network consisting of n users, i.e., users 1, 2, · · · , n. We
would like to show perfect location privacy when n goes to
infinity. Remember that Xu(t) shows the location of user u at
time t.
In a two-state model, let us assume we have state 0 and
state 1. There is a sequence p1, p2, p3, · · · for the users. In
particular, for user u we have pu = P(Xu(k) = 1) for times
k = 1, 2, · · · . Thus, the locations of each user u are determined
by a Bernoulli (pu) process.
When we set n ∈ N as the number of users, we assume m
to be the number of adversary’s observations per user,
m = m(n) = cn2−α where 0 < α < 1.
So, we have n→ ∞ if and only if m→ ∞.
As defined previously, X(m)u contains m number of user u’s
locations and X(m) is the collection of X(m)u ’s for all users,
X(m)u =

Xu(1)
Xu(2)
...
Xu(m)
 , X(m) =
(
X(m)1 ,X
(m)
2 , · · · ,X(m)n
)
.
The permutation function applied to anonymize users is Π(n)
(or simply Π). For any set A ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , n}, we define
Π(A) = {Π(u) : u ∈ A}.
The adversary who knows all the pu’s, observes n
anonymized users for m number of times each and collects
their locations in Y(m)
Y(m) = Perm
(
X(m)1 ,X
(m)
2 , · · · ,X(m)n ; Π
)
=
(
Y(m)1 ,Y
(m)
2 , · · · ,Y(m)n
)
where Y(m)u = X
(m)
Π−1(u),Y
(m)
Π(u) = X
(m)
u .
Based on the assumptions of Theorem 1, if the following
holds
1) m = cn2−α, which c > 0, 0 < α < 1 and are constant
2) p1 ∈ (0, 1)
3) (p2, p3, · · · , pn) ∼ fP, 0 < δ1 < fP < δ2
4) P = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) be known to the adversary,
then we want to show
∀k ∈ N, lim
n→∞ I
(
X1(k); Y(m)
)
= 0
i.e., user 1 has perfect location privacy and the same applies
for all other users.
8A. Proof procedure
Steps of the proof are as follows:
1) We show that there exists a sequence of sets J(n) ⊆
{1, 2, · · · , n} with the following properties:
• 1 ∈ J(n)
• if N(n) = |J(n)| then, N(n) → ∞ as n→ ∞
• let { jn}∞n=1 be any sequence such that jn ∈ Π(J(n)) then
P
(
Π(1) = jn|Y(m),Π(J(n))
)
→ 0
2) We show that
X1(k)|Y(m),Π(J(n)) d−→ Bernoulli(p1).
3) Using 2, we conclude
H
(
X1(k)|Y(m),Π(J(n))
)
→ H (X1(k))
and in conclusion,
I
(
X1(k); Y(m)
)
→ 0.
B. Detail of the proof
We define S (m)u for u = 1, 2, · · · , n to be the number of times
that user u was at state 1,
S (m)u = Xu(1) + Xu(2) + · · · + Xu(m).
Based on the assumptions, we have S (m)u ∼ Binomial(m, pu).
One benefit of S (m)u ’s is that they provide a sufficient statistic
for the adversary when the adversary’s goal is to obtain the
permutation Π(n). To make this statement precise, let’s define
S(m) as the vector containing S (m)u , for u = 1, 2, · · · , n:
S(m) =
(
S (m)1 , S
(m)
2 , · · · , S (m)n
)
Note that
S (m)
Π(u) = XΠ(u)(1) + XΠ(u)(2) + · · · + XΠ(u)(m)
= Yu(1) + Yu(2) + · · · + Yu(m) for u = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Thus, the adversary can obtain Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
, a permuted
version of S(m), by adding the elements in each column of
Y(m). In particular, we can write
Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
= Perm
(
S (m)1 , S
(m)
2 , · · · , S (m)n ; Π(n)
)
=
(
S (m)
Π−1(1), S
(m)
Π−1(2), · · · , S (m)Π−1(n)
)
.
We now state and prove a lemma that confirms
Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
is a sufficient statistic for the adversary when
the adversary’s goal is to recover Π(n). The usefulness of
this lemma will be clear since we can use the law of total
probability to break the adversary’s decision problem into two
steps of (1) obtaining the posterior probability distribution for
Π(n) and (2) estimating the locations Xu(k) given the choice of
Π(n).
Lemma 2. Given Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
, the random matrix Y(m) and
the random permutation Π(n) are conditionally independent.
That is
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Y(m) = y,Perm(S(m),Π(n)) = s) = (4)
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Perm(S(m),Π(n)) = s)
Proof. Remember
Y(m) = Perm
(
X(m)1 ,X
(m)
2 , · · · ,X(m)n ; Π(n)
)
=
(
X(m)
Π−1(1),X
(m)
Π−1(2), · · · ,X(m)Π−1(n)
)
.
Note that Y(m) (and therefore y) is an m by n matrix, so we
can write
y =
(
y1, y2, · · · , yn
)
,
where for u = 1, 2, · · · , n, we have
yu =

yu(1)
yu(2)
...
yu(m)
 .
Also, s is a 1 by n vector, so we can write
s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn) .
We now show that the two sides of Equation 4 are equal.
The right hand side probability can be written as
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Perm(S(m),Π(n)) = s) =
P
(
Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
= s
∣∣∣∣∣ Π(n) = pi) P (Π(n) = pi)
P
(
Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
= s
) =
P
(
Perm
(
S(m), pi
)
= s
∣∣∣∣∣ Π(n) = pi)
n!P
(
Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
= s
) =
P
(
Perm
(
S(m), pi
)
= s
)
n!P
(
Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
= s
) .
Now note that
P
(
Perm
(
S(m), pi
)
= s
)
= P
 n⋂
j=1
(
S (m)
pi−1( j) = s j
)
= P
 n⋂
u=1
(
S (m)u = spi(u)
)
=
n∏
u=1
P
(
S (m)u = spi(u)
)
=
n∏
u=1
(
m
spi(u)
)
pspi(u)u (1 − pu)m−spi(u)
=
n∏
k=1
(
m
sk
) n∏
u=1
pspi(u)u (1 − pu)m−spi(u)
9Similarly, we obtain
P
(
Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
= s
)
=∑
all permutations pi′
P
(
Perm
(
S(m), pi′
)
= s
∣∣∣∣∣Π(n) = pi′) P (Π(n) = pi′)
=
1
n!
∑
all permutations pi′
n∏
k=1
(
m
sk
) n∏
u=1
pspi′(u)u (1 − pu)m−spi′ (u)
=
1
n!
n∏
k=1
(
m
sk
) ∑
all permutations pi′
n∏
u=1
pspi′ (u)u (1 − pu)m−spi′ (u) .
Thus, we conclude that the right hand side of Equation 4 is
equal to ∏n
u=1 p
spi(u)
u (1 − pu)m−spi(u)∑
all permutations pi′
∏n
u=1 p
spi′ (u)
u (1 − pu)m−spi′ (u)
.
Now let’s look at the left hand side of Equation 4. First,
note that in the left hand side probability in Equation 4 we
must have
su =
m∑
k=1
yu(k) for u = 1, 2, · · · , n. (5)
Next, we can write
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Y(m) = y,Perm(S(m),Π(n)) = s) =
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Y(m) = y) .
This is because Perm
(
S(m),Π(n)
)
is a function of Y(m). We have
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Y(m) = y) =
P
(
Y(m) = y
∣∣∣∣∣ Π(n) = pi) P (Π(n) = pi)
P
(
Y(m) = y
)
We have
P
(
Y(m) = y
∣∣∣∣∣ Π(n) = pi)
=
n∏
u=1
p
∑m
k=1 ypi(u)(k)
u (1 − pu)m−
∑m
k=1 ypi(u)(k)
=
n∏
u=1
pspi(u)u (1 − pu)m−spi(u) Using Euqation (5)
Similarly, we obtain
P
(
Y(m) = y
)
=
1
n!
∑
all permutations pi′
n∏
u=1
pspi′ (u)u (1 − pu)m−spi′(u)
Thus, we conclude that the left hand side of Equation 4 is
equal to ∏n
u=1 p
spi(u)
u (1 − pu)m−spi(u)∑
all permutations pi′
∏n
u=1 p
spi′ (u)
u (1 − pu)m−spi′ (u)
,
which completes the proof.

Next, we need to turn our attention to defining the critical
set J(n). First, remember that
m = cn2−α where 0 < α < 1.
We choose real numbers θ and φ such that 0 < θ < φ < α2−α ,
and define
m ,
1
m
1
2 +φ
βm ,
1
m
1
2−θ
.
We now define the set J(n) for any positive integer n as follows:
Set J(n) consists of the indices of users such that the probability
of them being at state 1 is within a range with m difference
around p1,
J(n) = {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : p1 − m < pi < p1 + m}.
Clearly for all n, 1 ∈ J(n). The following lemma confirms that
the number of elements in J(n) goes to infinity as n→ ∞.
Lemma 3. If N(n) , |J(n)|, then N(n) → ∞ as n → ∞. More
specifically, as n→ ∞,
∃λ, c′′ > 0 : P(N(n) > c′′nλ)→ 1 as n→ ∞.
Proof. Remember that we assume pu’s are drawn indepen-
dently from some continuous density function, fP(p), on the
(0, 1) interval which satisfiesδ1 < fP(p) < δ2 p ∈ (0, 1)fP(p) = 0 p < (0, 1)
So given p1 ∈ (0, 1), for n large enough (so that m is small
enough), we have
P(p1 − m < pi < p1 + m) =
∫ p1+m
p1−m
fP(p)dp,
so we can conclude that
2mδ1 < P(p1 − m < pi < p1 + m) < 2mδ2.
We can find a δ such that δ1 < δ < δ2 and
P(p1 − m < pi < p1 + m) = 2mδ.
Then, we can say that N(n) ∼ Binomial(n, 2mδ), where
m =
1
m
1
2 +φ
=
1
(cn2−α)( 12 +φ)
.
The expected value of N(n) is n2mδ, and by substituting m
we get
E[N(n)] = n2mδ =
n2δ
(c′n2−α)( 12 +φ)
= c′′n(
α
2 +αφ−2φ).
Let us set λ = α2 + αφ − 2φ. Since φ < α2−α , we have λ > 0.
Therefore, we can write
E[N(n)] = c′′nλ,
Var(N(n)) = n(2mδ)(1 − 2mδ)→ nλ(1 + o(1)).
Using Chebyshev’s inequality
P(|N(n) − E[N(n)]| > c
′′
2
nλ) <
nλ(1 + o(1))
c′′2
4 n
2λ
→ 0
10
P(N(n) >
c′′
2
nλ)→ 1 as n→ ∞.

The next step in the proof is to show that users that are
identified by the set J(n) produce a very similar moving process
as user 1. To make this statement precise, we provide the
following definition. Define the set A(m) as the interval in R
consisting of real numbers which are within the mβm distance
from mp1 (the expected number of times that user 1 is at state
1 during the m number of observations),
A(m) = {x ∈ R,m(p1 − βm) ≤ x ≤ m(p1 + βm)}.
Lemma 4. We have
P
 ⋂
j∈J(n)
(
S (m)j ∈ A(m)
)→ 1 as n→ ∞
Proof. Let j ∈ J(n) and p1 − m < p j < p1 + m. Then
S (m)j ∼ Binomial(m, p j). By Large Deviation Theory (Sanvo’s
Theorem), we can write
P
(
S (m)j > m(p1 + βm)
)
<
(m + 1)2−mD(Bernoulli(p1+βm)‖Bernoulli(p j))
By using the fact that for all p ∈ (0, 1)
D (Bernoulli(p + )‖Bernoulli(p)) = 
2
2p(1 − p) ln p + O(
3),
we can write
D
(
Bernoulli(p1 + βm)‖Bernoulli(p j)
)
=
(p1 + βm − p j)2
2p j(1 − p j) ln 2 + O
(
(p1 + βm − p j)3
)
.
Note that
∣∣∣p1 − p j∣∣∣ < m, so for large m we can write∣∣∣p1 + βm − p j∣∣∣ ≥ βm − m = 1
m
1
2 +φ
− 1
m
1
2−θ
>
1
2
m
1
2−θ
.
so we can write
D
(
Bernoulli(p1 + βm)‖Bernoulli(p j)
)
=
1
8p j(1 − p j)m1−2θ ln 2 + O((p1 + βm − p j)
3)
and for some constant c′ > 0
D
(
Bernoulli(p1 + βm)‖Bernoulli(p j)
)
>
c′
m1−2θ
⇒
mD
(
Bernoulli(p1 + βm)‖Bernoulli(p j)
)
>
mc′
m1−2θ
> c′m2θ ⇒
P(S (m)j > m(p1 + βm)) < m2
−c′m2θ .
So in conclusion
P
 ⋃
j∈J(n)
S (m)j > m(p1 + βm)
 < |J(n)|m2−c′m2θ
|J(n)|m2−c′m2θ < nm2−c′m2θ < m22−c′m2θ → 0 as m→ ∞.
Similarly we obtain
P
 ⋃
j∈J(n)
S (m)j < m(p1 − βm)
→ 0 as m→ ∞,
which completes the proof. This shows that for all users j for
which p j is within 2 range around p1, i.e. it is in set J(n), the
average number of times that this user was at state 1 is within
mβm from mp1 with high probability. 
We are now in a position to show that distinguishing
between the users in J(n) is not possible for an outside observer
(i.e., the adversary) and this will pave the way in showing
perfect location privacy.
Lemma 5. Let {am}∞m=1, {bm}∞m=1 be such that am, bm are in set
A(m) and also {im}∞m=1, { jm}∞m=1 be such that im, jm are in set
J(n). Then, we have
P(S (m)im = am, S
(m)
jm
= bm)
P(S (m)im = bm, S
(m)
jm
= am)
→ 1 as m→ ∞.
Proof. Remember that
A(m) = {x ∈ R,m(p1 − βm) ≤ x ≤ m(p1 + βm)}
where βm = 1
m
1
2 −θ
and S (m)j ∼ Binomial(m, p j). Thus, S (m)im ∼
Binomial(m, pim ) and S
(m)
jm
∼ Binomial(m, p jm ),
P(S (m)im = am) =
(
n
am
)
pamim (1 − pim )m−am ,
P(S (m)jm = bm) =
(
n
bm
)
pbmjm (1 − p jm )m−bm .
In conclusion,
∆m =
P(S (m)im = am, S
(m)
jm
= bm)
P(S (m)im = bm, S
(m)
jm
= am)
= (
pim
p jm
)am−bm (
1 − p jm
1 − pim
)am−bm
ln ∆m = (am − bm) ln( pimp jm
) + (am − bm) ln(1 − p jm1 − pim
)
and since {im, jm} ∈ J(n) we have∣∣∣pim − p jm ∣∣∣ ≤ 2m = 2
m
1
2 +φ
.
Also, since {am, bm} ∈ A(m) we can say that
|am − bm| ≤ 2mβm.
Since pim ≤ p jm + 2m and 1 − p jm ≤ (1 − pim ) + 2m and
ln(1 + m) = m + O(2m)
we can write
ln ∆m ≤ 2mβmm + 2mβmm + 2mβmO(2m)
and since φ > θ,
mβmm = m
1
m
1
2 +φ
1
m
1
2−θ
=
1
mφ−θ
→ 0,
⇒ ln ∆m → 0
⇒ ∆m → 1.
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Note that the convergence is uniform.
This shows that for two users i and j, if the probability
of them being at state 1 is in set J(n), pi, p j ∈ J(n), and also
the observed number of times for these users to be at state 1
is in set A(m), then distinguishing between these two users is
impossible. 
Lemma 6. For any j ∈ Π(J(n)), we define W (n)j as follows
W (n)j = P(Π(1) = j|Y(m),Π(J(n))).
Then, for all j(n) ∈ Π(J(n)),
N(n)W (n)j
p−→ 1.
More specifically, for all γ1, γ2 > 0 , there exists no such that
if n > no:
∀ j ∈ Π(J(n)) : P
(∣∣∣∣N(n)W (n)j − 1∣∣∣∣ > γ1) < γ2.
Proof. This is the result of Lemma 5. First, remember that∑
j∈Π(J(n))
W (n)j = 1,
and also note that
|Π(J(n))| = |J(n)| = N(n) → ∞ as n→ ∞.
Here, we show that for any { jn}∞n=1 ∈ Π(J(n)),
W (n)jn
W (n)1
=
P (Π(1) = j|D)
P (Π(1) = 1|D)
p−→ 1
where D =
(
Y(m),Π(J(n))
)
.
Let ai, for i ∈ Π(J(n)), be the permuted observed values of
S (m)i ’s. Then note that
P(Π(1) = j|D) =
∑
permutation
such that Π(1)= j
∑
i∈Π(J)
P(S (m)i = ai).
Then, in
W (n)jn
W (n)1
=
P(Π(1) = j|D)
P(Π(1) = 1|D)
the numerator and denominator have the same terms. In
particular, for each term
P(S (m)j = a jn ) × P(S (m)1 = b jn ) × [other terms]
in W (n)j , there is a corresponding term
P(S (m)j = b jn ) × P(S (m)1 = a jn ) × [other terms]
in W (n)1 . Since by Lemma 5
P(S (m)j = a jn ) × P(S (m)1 = b jn )
P(S (m)j = b jn ) × P(S (m)1 = a jn )
converges uniformly to 1, we conclude
W (n)jn
W1
→ 1.
We conclude that for any ζ > 0, we can write (for large enough
n)
(1 − ζ) <
W (n)jn
W1
< (1 + ζ),
∑
j∈Π(J(n))
(1 − ζ)W (n)1 <
∑
j∈Π(J(n))
W (n)jn <
∑
j∈Π(J(n))
(1 + ζ)W (n)1
and since
∑
j∈Π(J(n)) W
(n)
jn
= 1, |Π(J(n))| = N(n), we have
(1 − ζ)N(n)W (n)1 < 1 < (1 + ζ)N(n)W (n)1
so, we conclude that N(n)W (n)1 → 1 as n → ∞. We can repeat
the same argument for all users in set j ∈ J(n) and we get
N(n)W (n)j → 1 as n→ ∞. 
Now to finish the proof of Theorem 1,
P(X1(k)|Y(m),Π(J(n))) =∑
j∈Π(J(n))
P(X1(k)|Y(m),Π(1) = j,Π(J(n)))×
P(Π(1) = j|Y(m),Π(J(n))) =∑
j∈Π(J(n))
1[Y (m)j (k)=1]W
(n)
j , Zn.
But, since Y (m)j (k) ∼ Bernoulli(p(n)j ) and p(n)j → p1 for all
j ∈ Π(J(n)), by the law of large numbers we have:
1
N(n)
∑
j∈Π(J(n))
1[Y (m)j (k)=1] → p1
Zn =
1
N(n)
∑
j∈Π(J(n))
(1[Y (m)j (k)=1])(N
(n)W (n)j )
which (N(n)W (n)j )→ 1. Thus, Zn → p1.
In conclusion X1(k)|Y(m),Π(J(n)) d−→ Bernoulli(p1) which
means that
H
(
X1(k)|Y(m),Π(J(n))
)
→ H(X1(k))
⇒ H
(
X1(k)|Y(m)
)
≤ H
(
X1(k)|Y(m),Π(J(n))
)
→ H(X1(k))
⇒ I
(
X1(k); Y(m))
)
→ 0
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1
Here, we provide a formal proof for Lemma 1 which we
restate as follows. In the Markov chain setting of section VI,
we have the following: Given Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
, the random
matrix Y(m) and the random permutation Π(n) are conditionally
independent. That is
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Y(m) = y,Perm(M(m),Π(n)) = m) = (6)
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Perm(M(m),Π(n)) = s)
Proof. Remember
Y(m) = Perm
(
X(m)1 ,X
(m)
2 , · · · ,X(m)n ; Π(n)
)
=
(
X(m)
Π−1(1),X
(m)
Π−1(2), · · · ,X(m)Π−1(n)
)
.
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Note that Y(m) (and therefore y) is an m by n matrix, so we
can write
y =
(
y1, y2, · · · , yn
)
,
where for u = 1, 2, · · · , n, we have
yu =

yu(1)
yu(2)
...
yu(m)
 .
Also, m is a collection of n matrices so we can write
m = (m1,m2, · · · ,mn) .
For an r × r matrix m = [m(i, j)], let’s define D(m) as the
set of sequences (x1, x2, · · · , xm) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r}m that satisfy
the following properties:
1) x0 = 1;
2) The number of transitions from i to j in (x1, x2, · · · , xm)
is equal to mi j for all i and j. That is, the number of
indices k for which we have xk = i and xk+1 = j is equal
to m(i, j).
We now show that the two sides of Equation 6 are equal.
The right hand side probability can be written as
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Perm(M(m),Π(n)) = m)
=
P
(
Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
= m
∣∣∣∣∣ Π(n) = pi) P (Π(n) = pi)
P
(
Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
= m
)
=
P
(
Perm
(
M(m), pi
)
= m
∣∣∣∣∣ Π(n) = pi)
n!P
(
Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
= m
)
=
P
(
Perm
(
M(m), pi
)
= m
)
n!P
(
Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
= m
) .
Now note that
P
(
Perm
(
M(m), pi
)
= m
)
= P
 n⋂
j=1
(
M(m)
pi−1( j) = m j
)
= P
 n⋂
u=1
(
M(m)u = mpi(u)
)
=
n∏
u=1
P
(
M(m)u = mpi(u)
)
=
n∏
u=1
∑
(x1,x2,··· ,xm)∈
D(mpi(u))
P(Xu(1) = x1, Xu(2) = x2, · · · , Xu(m) = xm)
=
n∏
u=1
∑
(x1,x2,··· ,xm)∈D(mpi(u))
∏
i, j
pu(i, j)mpi(u)(i, j)
=
n∏
u=1
|D(mpi(u))|∏
i, j
pu(i, j)mpi(u)(i, j)

=
 n∏
k=1
|D(mk)|

 n∏
u=1
∏
i, j
pu(i, j)mpi(u)(i, j)

Similarly, we obtain
P
(
Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
= m
)
=∑
all permutations pi′
P
(
Perm
(
M(m), pi′
)
= m
∣∣∣∣∣ Π(n) = pi′) P (Π(n) = pi′)
=
1
n!
∑
all permutations pi′
 n∏
k=1
|D(mk)|

 n∏
u=1
∏
i, j
pu(i, j)mpi′ (u)(i, j)

=
1
n!
 n∏
k=1
|D(mk)|
 ∑
all permutations pi′
 n∏
u=1
∏
i, j
pu(i, j)mpi′ (u)(i, j)
 .
Thus, we conclude that the right hand side of Equation 6 is
equal to ∏n
u=1
∏
i, j pu(i, j)mpi(u)(i, j)∑
all permutations pi′
(∏n
u=1
∏
i, j pu(i, j)mpi′ (u)(i, j)
) .
Now let’s look at the left hand side of Equation 6. We can
write
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Y(m) = y,Perm(M(m),Π(n)) = m) =
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Y(m) = y) .
This is because Perm
(
M(m),Π(n)
)
is a function of Y(m). We
have
P
(
Π(n) = pi
∣∣∣∣∣ Y(m) = y) =
P
(
Y(m) = y
∣∣∣∣∣ Π(n) = pi) P (Π(n) = pi)
P
(
Y(m) = y
)
We have
P
(
Y(m) = y
∣∣∣∣∣ Π(n) = pi) =
n∏
u=1
P
(
Xu(1) = ypi(u)(1), Xu(2) = ypi(u)(2),
· · · , Xu(m) = ypi(u)(m)
)
=
n∏
u=1
∏
i, j
pu(i, j)mpi(u)(i, j).
Similarly, we obtain
P
(
Y(m) = y
)
=
1
n!
∑
all permutations pi′
n∏
u=1
∏
i, j
pu(i, j)mpi′ (u)(i, j)
13
Thus, we conclude that the left hand side of Equation 6 is
equal to ∏n
u=1
∏
i, j pu(i, j)mpi(u)(i, j)∑
all permutations pi′
(∏n
u=1
∏
i, j pu(i, j)mpi′ (u)(i, j)
) ,
which completes the proof.

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